N A GROWING BODY of theological literature, globalization serves as a heuristic to structure and interpret the delicate balance between the experience of an increasingly interdependent world community and recognition of the radical differences among traditions and cultures. Meeting the exigencies of globalization has become the measure of the adequacy of contemporary theological reflection and education.
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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES the effective history of tradition and language which "constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience." 12 Acknowledging our preunderstandings is at the same time an acknowledgement of the other as other. This is the second step in modern hermeneutics: in the encounter with the other, there is not only an awareness of the interpreter's own tradition, but there is a recognition of the other's validity claims. In the hermeneutical encounter, the other is presented as an other who provokes serious attention; the other makes a claim on the interpreter. Questioning takes on a dual character: the interpreter not only asks questions of the other but is questioned by the other. The interpreter must risk acknowledging the other's claim to attention in order to reach genuine self-knowledge. How great this risk can be comes to full force in the encounter with the radically "ethical" other. The experience of the other may underline similarities or create a sense of resonance and commonality; but it may also elicit a sense of ambiguity and terror. The radically other may not embody only the good but evil. Ideology critique prevents too sanguine a notion of the hermeneutical recognition of the other. A variety of responses can emerge from the "hermeneutical recognition" of the other, ranging from acceptance to tolerance to repugnance.
As a third step in modern hermeneutics, Gadamer offers the model of the "game" (Spiel) to capture the interaction that occurs in an encounter. The structure of a game is such that it fulfills its purpose "only if the player loses himself in his play." 13 The reality of the game is disclosed or brought about by players who allow themselves to be controlled by the back-and-forth movement that constitutes the game. To play the game means to be lost in something that is really beyond one's control. A player who takes charge by breaking the rules of the game is nothing more than a spoilsport. As Tracy writes, "When we really play any game it is not so much we who are playing as it is the game which plays us." 14 "Playing a game" is an analogue for the dialogue or conversation that occurs in the encounter with the radically other. Entering into conversation with the other becomes like entering into a game where what is put into play are our prejudgments, and we thereby risk them-risk their repudiation, modification, maturation, or substitu-489 tion. 15 The rules of dialogue require a willingness to take seriously the validity claims of the other. "When no question other than our own is allowed, then conversation is impossible." 16 What occurs in the to-andfro of the dialogue, then, is neither the escape from one tradition to another nor the creation of a transhistorical viewpoint, neither the naive assimilation of one perspective into another nor the precipitous dismissal of one by the other; what takes place is what Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizons." 17 The outcome of a true dialogical experience or conversation is not foreseen beforehand. The dialogue with the other leads to the transformation of perspectives, the discovery of new possibilities, and a growth in knowledge. Hermeneutically, then, the focus is on the "newness" that results from the dialogue with the other. "To understand at all is to understand for and within genuine dialogue allowing real manifestations of the other's truth and thereby mutual transformation." 18 The consequence of overlooking this process of transformation or halting it prematurely by raising one perspective above revision is captured by Lonergan when he writes:
The general bias of common sense involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas; and this disregard not only excludes their implementation but also deprives subsequent stages both of the further ideas to which they would give rise, and of the correction that they and their retinue would bring to the ideas that are implemented. 19 The condition of possibility for this kind of development is the malleability of tradition and language; what they create is a limited but fluid horizon capable of being enriched through the encounter and interaction with the other. This hermeneutical conception of knowledge has ontological and ethical implications for the encounter with the radically other: through the dialogue with the other new insights and perspectives on the world are continually disclosed in a way that resists domination by any of the partners in the conversation. But there is also a methodological advantage to this conception of knowledge. Viewing the encounter with the radically other as a dialogue has the advantage of steering between the Scylla of relativism and the Charybdis of essen-490 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES tialism. The question of ethical pluralism cannot be adequately treated by either exclusivist or inclusivist methodologies. 20 Rather, one enters the dialogue from a particular tradition acknowledging its validity claims, and at the same time with the conviction that one can learni.e. be enriched-from a dialogue with the radically other. 21 
THE CHARACTER OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE
In bringing a hermeneutical methodology into the area of morality, a first concern is the nature of moral truth. The rational structure of reality that is presupposed by moral cognition is ordered by meaning. 22 Meaning is the rationally necessary and ultimate ground of justification of a moral norm. Moral claims that are meant to guide praxis encapsulate the implications of this ultimate ground. 23 In a word, moral truth is a truth of meaning. This points the direction for the further considerations; this theory of knowledge creates an anthropology of knowledge, in which, as Apel writes, "all the presuppositions which make the formulation of a problem meaningful can be brought to the fore." 24 As a science of meaning, ethics refers most originally to the ideology of human flourishing or the meaning of the morally good life. As a truth of meaning, the ideology of human flourishing is not perceived as an object that stands alongside others; rather it animates one's entire life project. The ideology of human flourishing does not stand over and against reason like an object in the world; rather it is the goal of our striving.
25
As the soul of one's life project, meaning conditions freedom. In a moral context freedom is not the ability to choose between objects; freedom is the ability to achieve the good. By providing a normative orientation to reality, meaning provides the legitimate boundaries of freedom.
This approach to moral truth and freedom also impacts the objectivity of a moral claim. The justification of moral conduct differs crucially from the neutral assessment of the natural sciences. The justification of a moral claim makes sense only in reference to the insight and freedom of the subject; this protects against any heteronomous justification of the moral claim. In terms of the sociology of knowledge, the context of genesis is not only embodied in the context of justification, but the former is constitutive of the latter. 26 The objectivity of a moral claim cannot be detached from a more original subjective context. Though a transcendental category, human subjectivity is not an empty category. Human subjectivity is structured by the mutually conditioning relationship between the ideology of human flourishing and the normative understanding of human reality. Together they guide freedom and insight. The progressive mediation of morality and anthropology-or between metaphysical and historical categories-is the task of the autonomy of moral reasoning.
The autonomy of moral reasoning is not understood in a Kantian sense of the self-sufficiency of reason. Recent studies in epistemology and the philosophy of science have underlined the hermeneutical axiom of the conditionedness of all thought and knowledge. 27 Reason is always already embedded in cognitive and linguistic contexts. In a postmodern environment, the reference is always to a relational autonomy of reason. But while there has been a clear antimodern emphasis in the literature detailing the narrative structure of moral reasoning, that structure cannot be taken to mean that reason is landlocked in a closed horizon; the narrative structure of reason would degenerate then into "confessionalism" or "fideism. 
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The universal community of communication impels the expansion of the finite perspectives of the participants. With a relational autonomy, the dialogue with the radically other shifts the emphasis away from the narrative structure of reason to the experiential adequacy of reason's conditions. Again, the hermeneutical category of "newness" comes to the fore. This means that in the dialogue with the radically other, the autonomy of moral reason assumes the responsibility to project beyond the limits of cognitive and linguistic horizons, to think beyond oppositions, and to achieve mutual and cooperative understanding.
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The relational autonomy of moral reasoning also implies a conception of history. History is not equated with the cosmocentric category of time. History is an anthropological category; it is the explicitation or projection of meaning into time; history is time interpreted or transcended by meaning. 33 The ideology of human fulfillment and the normative understanding of reality which embodies it point the direction for this process, and they provide the necessary network of cognitive relations and the standards of freedom in which history takes place. History is the accomplishment of freedom and insight. Moral reason builds a normal scientific tradition with a family resemblance or internal coherence among norms. Sharing in a cognitive tradition allows moral reason to pose questions in a meaningful way, perceive relevant problems, and provide adequate answers. As in all sciences, however, the traditional criteria for the recognition and solution of problems stand in an essential tension with emancipatory possibilities. At times, the scientific community is required to question the otherwise unquestioned assumptions by which the community works; new insights are progressively discovered, communicated and carried through in better alternatives of action. 34 The resultant shift of paradigm is characterized as progress. Similarly, the autonomy of moral reason serves not only the appropriation but the transvaluation of its linguistic and cognitive tradition. In the tension between traditional and emancipatory possibilities, moral reason assumes a critical and creative role vis-à-vis the tradition.
The creative role of moral reasoning comes to the fore in the encounter with the radically other, an encounter that opens up the possibility of new insights being achieved, revising normative descriptions of the world and altering traditional standards of freedom. No doubt this depends upon the willingness to acknowledge in the other an authentic embodiment of exemplary experience and the identification of the criteria by which this is so. 35 The mutual recognition of participants that is a prerequisite for a genuine dialogue is dependent upon the recovery of the standards of freedom disclosed in the exemplary experiences of the participants. Only then can the transformative power of the encounter with the other come to the fore. Dialogue with the other, then, becomes the means to expand the community of communication; the history of moral freedom is a history of emancipation. The autonomy of moral reason is responsible for this process of liberation which can be characterized as moral progress.
In the dialogue with the other, attention is focused also on the network of cognitive relations in which moral reason works and the mutually conditioning relationship which exists between insight and freedom. Tradition is the objective and prior condition of possibility for moral reason; but this means that tradition provides the subjective knowledge of the real possibilities of freedom. 37 There is an original use of this distinction in James Keenan, S.J., Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae (Washington: Georgetown Univ., 1992). 38 Within the hierarchy of goods, there are personal goods and material goods. When the accent is on a personal good, the ideology of human flourishing impinges directly on the norm; when the accent is on a material good, the ideology of human flourishing impinges mediately on the norm. 495 worldly behavior sanctioned or prohibited by the norm is predetermined by this transcendental project to avoid any hint of subjectivism; on the other hand, only an objectivist paradigm of moral knowledge would separate the categorial content of the norm from its transcendental ground.
Finally, although the abstract formulation of the moral norm helps guarantee a level of communicability and agreement across diverse moral traditions, there is a deceptive surety to the abstract formulation of the norm. The meaning of the norm is only known in praxis. Praxis is not only the goal of the norm: praxis is the foundation for the understanding of the norm. 39 Because they embody prior normative descriptions of reality, norms that read the same may sanction or prohibit radically different praxis. In this sense, there may be a practical incommensurability between moral norms. In the terminology of the philosophy of language, a norm may have the same locutionary force, but that is no guarantee that a norm will have the same ilhcutionary force.
MORAL AUTONOMY AND SALVATION HISTORY
In recent literature, the relevance of faith for normative ethics has been treated under the rubric of an autonomous ethic in the context of faith, or an ethic of faith (Glaubensethik). 41 The debate has focused on whether or not there is a specifically Christian ethic. 42 Lacking in the literature, however, is a concern for the interests that condition and limit the question of specificity. For instance, while an autonomous ethic protects the rational and communicable character of a moral claim, it is based on a tacit ideal of science which has been surpassed by a historically informed philosophy of science. On the other hand, while an ethic of faith underlines the fact that adjudicating evidence is always rhetorical, it overlooks the need to question a claim's adequacy to experience. 43 Neither option can adequately conceive of the encoun- 
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ificity" is an anthropology of knowledge within which faith and reason remain juxtaposed to each other; when faith is extrinsic to reason, reason too easily assumes a universalist character. 47 Breaking from the ideal of science of the Enlightenment has an immediate impact on natural-law arguments in theology. The object of the natural law is not only inner-worldly behavior but the transcendental ground of behavior. Similar to the grammar that structures the meaningful use of language, this conditioning ground sketches the horizon in which natural-law arguments are made; it predetermines moral experience and insight; it provides the criteria for normativity. In this way, there is no natural-law argument that is not under the sway of the effective history of faith.
48 Faith provides the hermeneutical key to unlock the meaning of nature-not in its phenomenal structure, but in its normativity.
Pedagogically, the creed incorporates the believer into a community. So while the truths of the creed do not provide specific moral norms, the truths expressed in the creed influence moral reasoning in an indirect way by forming the self-understanding of the believing community. There are what Demmer calls "anthropological implications" of faith which determine freedom, guide reason, and animate moral action. They stand as middle terms between moral truth and the truths of faith. 49 The anthropological implications of faith form the background knowledge of anyone incorporated into the believing community. They provide the contours of a Christian pattern of perception. They form a habit of mind, and sensitize the believer to perceive the world a certain way; they inform and elucidate descriptions and interpretations of the world. They form basic human integrative convictions through which moral experiences are organized; they circumscribe a horizon in which moral reason works. 50 The anthropological implications of faith do not solve moral problems; rather, they help "set the problem" and put into motion a network of cognitive relations through 47 In a third article of faith, the Christian professes "to wait for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come." With this belief, the Christian confidently leaves the final judgment on history to God (1 Cor 4:5). This allows moral reasoning to continually relativize "final" judgements within human relationships. In other words, dialogue with the other is never broken off in resignation. Language involves not only speaking but listening. Listening to the other translates into a readiness for reconciliation so that the healing of brokenness and divisiveness is at the heart of human language. 53 Dialogue with the other presupposes that truth emerges through listening; through the conversatio cum aliis, truth unfolds into history. By its nature, dialogue transcends the vicious circle of violence and retribu-499 tion with the hope of reconciliation (Matt 18:21-22). In the end, the ability to dialogue with the other generates a capability for peace and leads to the achievement of reconciliation and the bettering of the situation at hand.
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These articles of faith provide a strictly theological ground for the necessary pragmatic conditions of dialogue: the principle of respect and the principle of reciprocity. 55 The pragmatic conditions of dialogue, however, entail normatively relevant assumptions. The principles of respect and reciprocity have normatively relevant content that precedes and guides the dialogue with the other. In entering into the dialogue with the other, the foremost sum of the Christian is not to resolve differences but to sustain "those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue." 56 The pragmatic conditions of dialogue entail a pledge to resist any effort to close off the principally universal horizon of communication or draw in the boundaries of the hermeneutical circle so as to exclude the other.
The Christian community, then, does not have a complete body of moral knowledge which is simply transferred from one context to another. Rather, by resisting the temptation to alienate or dominate the other, the Christian community is in a position to acknowledge and integrate into its horizon of meaning the truth of the other. 57 At the same time, the plausibility of the insights and praxis of the faith community serve the universal community of communication. Implicit to the universal community of communication is the search for truth and a responsibility for the world that extends beyond the faith community. 58 Finally, the basic principles of discourse ethics together with the normative constraints of argumentation serve as critical tests of the moral claims of the dialogue partners. 59 By being submitted to the requirements of communicative interaction, traditional standards of freedom can be criticized, destabilized and revised in order to set into 54 A basic methodological tenet of hermeneutical theory is that a text must be read in the context in which it occurs. 68 This means that the general context for the Synoptic Gospels is the Hebrew Scriptures; more specifically the context for the gospel writers is first-century Judaism. The New Testament must be read as a source for and product of first-century Judaism. The tradition of Judaism in the Second Temple period provides the context that will underline both the continuity and the newness that is found in the Synoptic Gospel accounts of Jesus' ministry. 69 By understanding the Judaic background of Jesus 9 preaching, one simultaneously captures the originality of his teaching. Newness or novelty is only understood in relation to the tradition it supersedes. The fundamental question is how a text confirms and/or critically develops the tradition from which it comes? 70 But hermeneutical reflection is not limited to a retrospective analysis; it is completed by a prospective analysis. Though the hermeneutical meaning of "context" refers primarily to the prehistory of a text, secondarily it refers to the effective history of the text. Here the theologian will move from the historical-critical questions of textual origins to the interpretive potential of the Christian texts. 71 The Christian texts provoke a history of interpretation; there is an ongoing reading of the Christian texts. Hermeneutical theory must bridge the distance between the text and the present. "Reading is the pharmakon, the 'remedy/ by which the meaning of the text is 'rescued' from the estrangement of distanciation and put in a new proximity, a proximity which suppresses and preserves the cultural distance and includes the otherness within the ownness." 72 Through reading there is a fusion of horizons between the text and the reader. 73 The ongoing fusion of horizons underlines the unavoid-able finitude and relatedness of all knowledge and the essential reference to tradition in all reasoning, but also the freedom to constitute new perspectives of thought and action within this tradition. 74 The importance of Scripture for moral argumentation is not that passages can be repeated so as to solve a contemporary moral dilemma. The importance of Scripture is that through a "reading" or an act of interpretation its truth may be continually and progressively appropriated by moral reasoning. 75 The fulfillment or accomplishment of the Law happens in two distinct ways. In the primary antithetic statements the Law is interiorized; "do not kill" becomes "do not be angry" (Matt 5:21-23); Jesus affirms the Law and presses beyond it by recovering its intention. As Sanders writes, "Jesus here appears as interpreter of the law, not its opponent." 80 In the secondary antithetic statements, however, Jesus assumes the freedom and authority to provide a new standard which transcends that embedded in the Law. 81 His teaching is a redirection of the Law in light of the command to seek a better righteousness. For instance, in place of the ius talionis, Jesus admonishes his disciples to seek better alternatives of action when confronted with the limitations and constrictions of human living (Matt 5:38-42). 82 Jesus' transcending of the ius talionis has repercussions on the logic of the casuistry which the law determined. The law of talion made sure that injustice was not ignored and limited uncontrolled vengeance by the threat of equal retaliation; the law served as a dam to keep evil at bay. 83 In the new age, however, the disciples of Christ receive a competency that redirects the casuistic logic of the ius talionis; they are able to strive for what is "qualitatively more." Evil is no longer to be controlled but surpassed by a better righteousness. 84 The extreme examples given in the gospel-turning the other cheek, giving up possessions, walking the extra mile, giving to those who ask-are not a new set of norms for the Christian, but reflect the Christian's seriousness to discover and implement better alternatives in face of all situations of human injustice, conflict, and limitation. The driving force behind the Christian's freedom to surpass evil with good is the unbounded mercy of God which the Christian is called to imitate (Matt 5:48). The New Testament understanding of God exerts a stimulating effective history on the ability of freedom to achieve the good in a way that even the strictest obedience to the Law was incapable of achieving. With this new competency of freedom comes a new strategy for moral action; the logic of the law of talion is reversed: the Christian is never resigned merely to controlling evil, but will strive to expand the area in which good can be done. 85 The Christological foundation of morality, when seen in a hermeneutical methodology, throws new light on the question of the proprium of Christian ethics. On the one hand, there is no specific normative content that is exclusive to Christians. On the other hand, locating the proprium of Christian ethics in a specific Christian intentionality overlooks the unity of experience and action. 86 Epistemologically, neither alternative is adequate; neither contributes to dialogue with the other in a global context.
The hermeneutical method that enables the dialogue with the other allows for a more radical solution by refocusing the question. Hermeneutically, the Christological foundation of ethics is not a question about specificity but about newness. 87 In this way, the question of the proprium of Christian ethics avoids the inadequate and abstract contrast between the law of Christ and the natural moral law. No doubt the newness of Jesus' preaching is of a formal nature, but that does not lessen its categorial relevance. What is given in the person of Christ is a criterion of moral agency to be continually recovered through the labor of interpretation. 88 The "reading" of the Scriptures sets into motion a new effective history of freedom which allows Christian moral reasoning to reconcile differences into a higher perspective or a more inclusive synthesis. With the competency of Christian freedom to strive for the qualitatively more, a new and better weighing of goods becomes possible. The qualitative more that Christian moral reason-ing strives for, however, is not some unattainable or Utopian ideal, but the development of genuine, communicable, and plausible possibilities of action for the community of communication.
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The newness of Christian ethics can be understood in terms of the distinction between moral goodness and rightness. Hermeneutically, there is no weighing of goods or moral rightness without reference to the legitimate expectations and standards of goodness. That is, there is no moral rightness as such; rightness is always bound to and reflective of an achieved competency of moral freedom. But this means that as freedom achieves new standards, moral rightness becomes a continual historical accomplishment. Moral rightness is not determined "by the nature of things" or nature's objectivity, because nature's normativity is under the effective history of freedom. 90 The reciprocally conditioning relationship between moral freedom and insight strives progressively to overcome prevailing limitations, injustices, or conflicts in human living. In this process of history, freedom is resituated in relation to nature, and moral norms are innovatively reformulated and given new meaning; then the moral praxis of the community is given a new communicative foundation.
SPEECH ACTS AND MORAL ACTION
A hermeneutical methodology also allows for a more nuanced treatment of moral action. A parallel or analogy can be made between speech acts and moral action. 92 A speech act can be analyzed according to the rules of the grammar which structure it (langue) or as an act of communication (parole). Linguistical and hermeneutical analysis are not separate concerns; both interests mutually condition each other.
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As structured communicative acts, speech acts and moral acts are mediated realities. Moral acts are structured by one's convictions and commitments. Normative ethics cannot be separated from virtue ethics; the latter provides the background against which the former is understood. One's actions reveal one's character. An adequate analysis of moral action must include the issue of character. This perspective shifts the emphasis away from an analysis of principles and norms; it focuses attention on the inner structure of moral action. The linguistic formulation of a moral norm is a second-order reality; the meaning of a moral norm is dependent upon the self-understanding of the subject. 95 One's basic commitments embody one's life goals and point the direction of future decisions; one's basic commitments form a communicative core that integrates experience and provides the physiognomy of moral insight. Contrast experiences sharpen the profile of one's life project. 96 They reveal that there is not only a hierarchy of truths but also a hierarchy of decisions. One's life project is present in a tacit way in individual moral acts and creates a family resemblance among them. Right actions are exemplary instantiations of what one has taken to be the meaning of human flourishing; moral action, then, can be said to be the last element in the constitution of history.
The parallel between the moral action and speech acts also precludes any solipsistic analysis of the moral act which is encouraged by a truncated notion of normative ethics. Both are social realities. As the means of communication, language presupposes a common world of understanding. 97 Similarly, an isolated moral act-like an isolated word or text-has no meaning; an act rather receives its meaning from within a community of communication. There is no contextindependent analysis of moral action. The practice of virtue or the formation of character make no sense outside socially embodied traditions whose normative descriptions of the world shape one's moral vision. 98 The analysis of the act is incomplete without the recovery of the anthropological context in which it is embedded. Every speech act discloses and witnesses to this more original and implicit context. The Eucharist, for instance, is the memoria passionis, mortis, et resurrec-
